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Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda
HELEN HINTJENS
Institute of Social Studies,The Netherlands
ABSTRACT When the journal Ethnicities was launched in 2001, the first issue
included an article by this author, which examined the politics of ‘race’ and identity
as central ingredients in the Rwanda genocide of 1994. This current article considers
how political identities have been reconstructed since the genocide, especially from
above. History, law and politics are examined, as central instruments in government
efforts to construct a new Rwandan society and ensure that genocide will ‘never
again’ be possible. Evidence suggests that inequalities in income and land distri-
bution have grown rapidly since 1994. At the same time, the poor and marginalized
often find it difficult to openly express their views, including their political identities
outside of officially circumscribed spaces and categories. Debates continue around
numbers of victims and perpetrators, and new inter-elite conflicts have emerged
along language lines. The article shows how race categories have been replaced with
new terms, which arise from a particular reading of the genocide. A new foundation
myth for Rwanda, a form of diasporic victim nationalism, is also briefly explored.
Re-labelling Rwandans from above, the state continues to exercise tight control
over the public expression of political identities. Open political debate is very
difficult; the government frequently feels it is being attacked, and accuses critics
of divisionism or harbouring a genocide mentality. If more inclusive forms of
Rwandan-ness are to emerge in future, state controls will need to be relaxed, so that
more complex forms of political identities can finally emerge.
KEY WORDS diasporic ● genocide ● history ● identity ● race
‘race’1 has indeed become a fratricidal word. (Montagu, 1953: 85)
Rwandan history is dangerous. (Gourevitch, 1998: 48)
. . . looking back and forwards at the same time, they are spin-offs of twisted
modernity . . . They feel rejected by the world, the state, by the political class . . .
‘identity’ is their last resort. (Doom, 2000: 80)
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INTRODUCTION
This article considers the debate on identity and the role of ethnic and racial
markers in Rwanda since the genocide of 1994.2 Citizenship has been recon-
structed, but has it become more open and participatory than before the
genocide? How has civil society been able to influence state policies?
‘Never again’, so goes the rhetoric of the present government of Rwanda,
will outmoded racial and genocidal ideologies haunt the lives of ordinary
Rwandans (Rafti, 2004: 6). The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which is
the sole party in power, claims its vision as the only enlightened one. Ethnic-
ity has been banned, even gender divisions are said to be gradually disap-
pearing, and Rwandan society is moving into a new era. The regime claims
it stands for the very antithesis of the racialized mentality of the past,
permanently associated with genocide. Do Rwandans now live in peace,
free of the scourge of race hatred, and thanks to their leaders’ foresight and
vigilance? Lofty claims like these are made to be questioned, and this article
will do just that.
The suggestion in this article is that whilst public expression of political
identities has been largely ‘de-racialized’, this has been done in a very top-
down and authoritarian manner. The result has prevented the emergence
from below of potentially more complex forms of political identification,
which could form the basis for more inclusive forms of Rwandan citizen-
ship in future.
Doom (2000), in the quotation at the beginning of this article, suggests
that within the ‘twisted’ global modernity that exists today, poor people in
marginalized situations may turn to identity politics as one of the few means
they have to assert their rights. Although he is thinking of the Mai Mai in
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; formerly, Zaire), Doom’s
observation that it is a basic right to be able to define one’s identity ‘from
below’, and without coercion, is pertinent to Rwanda. The starting premise
of this article is that the identity politics of the poor cannot be equated with
the genocidal mobilization of race-based identities. Whereas the latter can
be a threat to security, however defined, the former should not be repressed
in the name of security and post-genocide nation building.
Creating more inclusive forms of citizenship usually requires some
explicit bias on behalf of the most marginalized and socially excluded in
society (Kabeer, 2005; Mohanty and Tandon, 2006). Has the government of
Rwanda really devoted itself to enabling poor Rwandans to secure their
basic livelihoods, and to access their basic economic and social entitlements,
as well as protecting their civil and political liberties? Basic rights surely
need to be respected by the state before more inclusive and participatory
forms of citizenship can start to emerge at the national level. Or can unity
and consensus be imposed from above, as the RPF government seems to
believe? In principle, whatever is good for ordinary and poor Rwandans
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7should be central to the government’s priorities in the reconstruction
process, if social peace is to result. The RPF regime’s record will be assessed
on this basis.
Since ‘open criticism of authority remains a taboo’ for most poor and
ordinary people (Jones, 2005: 84), simply asking ordinary Rwandans
whether they find it easier to live with one another than in the past, and
how they now form their political identities is unlikely to produce reliable
results. One cannot expect frank answers to such sensitive questions, yet
these are the questions that need to be asked. Researchers who have
worked on related issues inside Rwanda in recent years have sometimes
found that asking too many probing questions, for example about political
identities, may attract the unwanted attention of the Rwandan authorities
(McDoom, 2005). Even those sympathetic to the Rwandan regime agree
that one must proceed with caution when exploring perspectives that may
be critical of the authorities (Jones, 2005: 93; Maina Peter and Kibalama,
n.d.). To understand what is happening to Rwandans’ political identities,
therefore, other less direct sources of data may be needed, if field work in
Rwanda is problematic.3 It is partly for this reason that the profiles of a
number of exiled Rwandans are included towards the end of this article.
Their stories tend to confirm – at a personal level – much of the evidence
contained in available sources, including human rights reports, reflections
by non-govenmental organization (NGO) workers, journalists, scholars and
others. Each testimony draws on a detailed legal case file, and is presented
anonymously to protect the individual’s identity. As ‘. . . opposition has
been forced into exile [and] can only exist outside Rwanda’, researchers
have followed, and the present researcher is no exception (quote from
Rafti, 2004: 8; see, e.g. Eltringham, 2004).
In the second section, we consider some scholarly prognoses for
Rwanda, and then reflect in the third section on the main changes in
identity politics, before examining post-genocide initiatives for reformulat-
ing political identities through history, law and politics in the fourth
section. Economic inequalities are then outlined, and debates around
numbers reviewed in the next two sections. The labelling of ‘saints’ and
‘sinners’ as it relates to patterns of political identity formation, inclusion
and exclusion in Rwanda today is the subject of the next section, which is
followed by presentation and analysis of the testimonies of exiles. Some
tentative conclusions are drawn in the final section. Throughout, an effort
is made to pay: ‘particular attention to the perspectives of the poor and
socially excluded’ (Kabeer, 2005: 1), especially the rural poor who still
form the vast majority of Rwanda’s population. ‘Ordinary’ Rwandans
include the urban poor, impoverished Tutsi survivors, landless people and
returnees without resources, but also the: ‘local peasants in the hills . . .
manipulated by the state to kill their erstwhile neighbours’ during the
genocide of 1994 (Karagyesa, 2004). To start with, we consider recent
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scholarly prognoses for Rwanda, ranging from the gloomiest to the rather
more optimistic.
TURNING TOWARDS THE FUTURE?
So what do scholars working on Rwanda ‘from the outside’ think of the
past, present and future prognoses for Rwanda? They do not seem to share
the sanguine view of the RPF leadership (and of Paul Kagame, in particu-
lar). Whereas the regime maintains that its own knowledge and expertise
can enable Rwandans to live in peace and prosperity, outside observers are
generally less convinced. These predictions concerning Rwanda’s middle-
to long-term future vary from those that foresee renewed threats of civil
war and genocide to those that raise the prospects of more democratic
futures, based on a frank acknowledgement of past mistakes and demilita-
rization of the wider Great Lakes region. Peaceful, more democratic norms
of governance are imagined, more inclusive forms of Rwandan citizenship
proposed, yet few scholars today share the overall optimism of the RPF
concerning Rwanda’s future. In the list below, the more pessimistic predic-
tions for Rwanda’s future come first, followed by those that at least imagine
some kind of positive transformations in the future:
● For someone like the present author, who warned against massive
violence during the years leading up to 1994, it is frustrating to
wonder whether, in two, five or 10 years from now, the international
community, again after the facts, will have to explain why Rwanda
has descended into hell once more (Reyntjens, 2004: 210).
● ‘The war [between the RPF and former Rwandan government]
. . . crystallised two volatile regional diasporas – one Hutu, the other
Tutsi – each determined to set the region on fire if the demands it
considered legitimate were not met’ (Mamdani, 2001: 263).
● ‘Arguably ethnic identity is more important today than it was during
preparations for the genocide’ (Buckley-Zistel, 2004).
● ‘Without a vision of the past which acknowledges that different
interpretations of history will exist, Rwanda . . . and the Great Lakes
region generally, will remain entrapped in an official discourse which
legitimates the use of violence and makes some, leaders and led,
génocidaires’ (Pottier, 2002: 207).
● ‘. . . a critique of colonialism and its effects on people’s categories of
perception was never allowed to develop and mature in Rwanda.
Although this critique is not the only measure needed in order to
bring about reconciliation in Rwanda, Rwandans must start here.
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9They must acknowledge, then question, then criticize the enduring
effects that colonialism has had on their own minds’ (Taylor, 1999:
177).
● ‘For the Congo, as for Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda [a political
solution] . . . implies the resolution of the crises of democratic
transition by putting an end to governments established by the force
of arms, and embarking on a path of genuine national reconciliation,
justice and inclusiveness’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2003: 264).
It is notable that some of the more gloomy prognoses above are from
‘seasoned scholars’, not Rwandans themselves, who have worked on the
Great Lakes region for years, sometimes decades. Among the somewhat
more optimistic, we see the importance of history, of more inclusive forms
of citizenship and of an approach that can transform the wider Great Lakes
region as well as Rwanda itself. Immediately following the genocide, the
RPF was given the benefit of the doubt by many scholars, journalists and
human rights organizations. The present author was no exception, and was
later criticized for naivety (Hintjens, 1999; Pottier, 2002: 121 and 123). Disil-
lusion set in soon after the end of the genocide, both among seasoned Great
Lakes observers and relative newcomers to the subject, with growing
evidence of coercive policies, including military and economic intervention
in the DRC, forced return of refugees, village resettlement schemes, and
harsh treatment of the political opposition inside and outside Rwanda.
Almost anyone could be accused of divisionism and harbouring a genocide
mentality. Some journalists previously sympathetic to the RPF came into
conflict with it once they became less complimentary; some were denied
visas, others found themselves unwelcome in Rwanda (Gerard Prunier and
Alison des Forges are two examples). As Doom puts it: ‘Working in the
Great Lakes region can be quite instructive for [anyone] . . . devoted to
objective research’ (Doom, 2000: 83). Accumulated expertise on the Great
Lakes region does not impress the Rwandan government; after decades of
research, some scholars are no longer able to conduct primary research in
Rwanda (Reyntjens is one, but he is not alone). In the next section, the
murkiness of identity politics in Rwanda is explored, and some points made
that are substantiated in detail later in the article.
THE OUTLINES OF THE PROBLEM: THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS
The Rwandan government, dominated by Paul Kagame and the RPF,
presents itself as a bulwark against the forces of genocide, including tribal-
ism, ethnicity and race ideology (Rafti, 2004). Under the Organic Law of
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2003, a new set of thought and speech crimes were introduced into the law,
including ‘divisionism’, ‘ethnic ideology’ and a ‘genocide mentality’. All are
seen as atavistic and backward looking, and ethnicity in any case has been
delegitimized (and is illegal) as a means of public political expression or
identification. Rwanda’s present rulers see themselves as steering the
country towards an enlightened, progressive future free of colonial and
racial mental maps. They also point to progress made in physical reconstruc-
tion, infrastructure, criminal justice and re-education of the population.
Unfortunately, not everyone sees things as the regime would like them
to. Even those who simply show that not everyone is benefiting equally
from Rwanda’s economic and political ‘progress’ can run the risk of being
accused of divisionism (Jones, 2005). Human rights NGOs, donors, ordinary
individuals, politicians and former allies can find themselves declared
enemies of the new Rwanda. Political opposition and criticism has been
criminalized, and for stating their beliefs about the government, Rwandans
can now be imprisoned, disappear, be forced into exile, or killed (Front
Line, 2005). This is explored in more detail later.
Giving the RPF the benefit of the doubt is important. This is in spite of
growing evidence of RPF involvement in war crimes, along with its military
wing the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), of Rwandan government and
army pillage in the DRC, and of human rights abuses in the country, especi-
ally the trend for killing, arresting and disappearing enemies at home (Front
Line, 2005; Hintjens, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2005). But when contro-
versial French Judge Bruguiere recently claimed RPF leaders had shot
down President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994, providing the spark
that set off the genocide, this was an accusation too far. Independent
sources such as Human Rights Watch refuted the findings as ‘political’. So
did the Kigali authorities. However, in accusing the judge of ‘negationism’
and genocide denial, and in claiming that the judge’s witnesses were:
‘. . . wanted persons in Rwanda’s criminal circles and opposition groups’
(Embassy of Rwanda, 2007), the government also showed its repressive
tendencies. It would be fair to say that on the question of who shot down
the President’s plane, the jury is still out and evidence is inconclusive
(though see Chossudovsky, 2003 and Reyntjens, 1995a; and Melvern, 2006
for two very different conspiracy theories).
Rwanda’s political leaders post-1994 distinguish themselves by their
political acumen in relation to their Anglo-Saxon partners. They have
astutely cultivated close diplomatic, aid and even intelligence relations with
the US and UK, speaking excellent English, appearing honest and business-
minded, and being suitably assertive with their partners, thus gaining their
grudging respect. Kagame, in particular, has an excellent feel for what will
work in the capitals of the English-speaking heartlands. The proclivities of
western diplomatic and political circles being what they are, they do not
object to being taken to task for their failures during the genocide in
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Rwanda in 1994, as long as they can assuage their guilt through develop-
ment aid or other forms of assistance (including military cooperation).
Sometimes in aid relations, nibbling the hand that feeds you is not a bad
idea. During the first few years after the genocide, some donors supported
reconciliation and reconstruction quite generously, including the Nether-
lands, UK and USA. Village resettlement schemes were funded that would
normally have been vetoed, were it not for donors’ awareness of the sensi-
tivity of the post-genocide security situation (Verwimp, 2003). Human
Rights Watch defined the problem in the following way:
Burdened by guilt over their inaction during the genocide . . . they generously
support the Rwandan government – credited with having ended the genocide –
while ordinarily overlooking its human rights abuses. (Human Rights Watch,
2005)
Thus, the US and UK governments took years to recognize, let alone
condemn RPF atrocities in neighbouring DRC, implicitly accepting the
Rwandan government’s argument that its presence across the borders was
for self-defence. Repression at home, including the banning of the main
opposition party, the MDR, and hounding of Rwandan NGOs, journalists
and politicians has not caused much more concern than military adventur-
ism in the DRC (Front Line, 2005).
An important factor in the regime’s continuing prestige in some circles
is its use of the media, and its cultivation of good diplomatic relations with
key partners. For a long time, the RPF was able to cultivate an image,
especially in the anglophone world, of a brave, overpopulated little country,
battling its genocidal legacies, trying to grapple with lawless killers across
the border, whilst fighting backwardness and poverty at home. With help
from its donors, so goes this story, the government was helping ordinary
Rwandans come to terms with their past, taste justice and move forward
into a new Rwanda. The regime tries to convince donors that only a strong
government can protect Rwandans against the ongoing threat of genocide
(Front Line, 2005: 98–102; Human Rights Watch, 2005). Kagame and the
RPF present themselves as fighting an invisible enemy, which means that
people’s attitudes towards race and ethnicity must be policed – and some
civil and political right sacrificed – if genocide is not to recur.4 The
Rwandan government claims its absolute priority is ‘never again’ (Rafti,
2004: 6).
The problem is that the regime monopolizes political correctness
(Pottier, 2000). Since only the RPF can police divisionism, it follows that
only the RPF can deliver real security for ordinary Rwandans in future.
They should therefore trust the government, and non-Rwandans should not
interfere. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘the Rwandan government
has created a veneer of stability by suppressing dissent and limiting the
exercise of civil and political rights. It often cites the need to avoid another
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genocide as the purported justification for such repressive measures’
(Human Rights Watch, 2005).
The RPF rejects any comparisons between the crimes of the 1994
genocide and its own war crimes and killings of civilians during the war of
1990 to 1994, as well as thereafter. Instead, the uniqueness of the 1994
genocide is asserted, and the government thus avoids facing up to its own
role in atrocities against civilians from 1990 onwards. Any parallels drawn
between the organized mass killings of Hutus in Burundi in 1972 and the
genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 is also vehemently rejected as
inappropriate. Yet both have been recognized as genocides (Eltringham,
2004; Novick, 2001: 188–201; Reyntjens, 1995b). The uniqueness argument
is offensive to those who lost relatives or suffered injury at the hands of the
RPF; more importantly, it is itself a form of denial.5
Game playing with donors during discussions over Rwanda’s human
rights record can be similarly manipulative. When the RPF government was
reminded that those accused of divisionism or a genocide mentality should
be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the reply from Kagame was
dismissive:
. . . genocide and divisionism are not Kinyarwanda words, and I don’t know
what it means in their [i.e. European Union] context. I suggest that they explain
it themselves. What we should be asked is whether what we are doing for this
country is good or not, and we will be ready to explain this. (Kagame, 2004)
The point may be fair, but a willingness to take criticism is the sign of an
open attitude, and something that is lacking on the part of this regime. Thus,
for instance, to be able to work in Rwanda, NGOs and other organizations
need to engage in ‘quiet diplomacy’, behind the scenes, if they are to avoid
accusations and risks. Organizations such as CARE and even USAID have
had to tread lightly in Rwanda and avoid any confrontation with the RPF.
As Jones sees the Rwandan context: ‘In this day and age, the government
is not receptive to anything other than a low-profile, collaborative
approach’ (Jones, 2005: 98). Any open criticism by embassies, donors or
NGOs places Rwandan staff in these organizations at particular risk, as well
as jeopardizing the agency’s capacity to operate effectively inside Rwanda
(Front Line, 2005: 103).
A recent study identified Rwandan NGOs as lacking in mutual solidarity,
something that can pose problems in ensuring their collective independent
voice vis-à-vis government. When one considers that the dominant
emotional tone in public life tends to be one of fear and distrust, this finding
is not that surprising (Maina Peter and Kibalama, n.d.). The report included
some discussion of ethnic and race labels, which were still used occasion-
ally, mostly in anger or in confessional mode, and generally in private
settings. Terms such as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa can only be used in public if it
is to dismiss them and deny their salience. Since the RPF took over power
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and refugees returned from throughout the Great Lakes region and
beyond, some new linguistic and political divisions have cut across the
formerly dominant ethnic identities of Rwandans, who are now divided (at
least at elite level) between the anglophones and the francophones. The
trouble is that:
Though seemingly subtle, these differences could have implications not only for
intra-civil society relations; [for] civil society-government-donor relations in
general, but also for the unity of Rwandan society as a whole (Maina Peter and
Kibalama, n.d.: 66).
The francophone population is itself divided between those who returned
to post-genocide Rwanda after many decades outside the country, those
who never fled but were invited to come to Rwanda as part of a wider
diaspora, and new caseload returnees who managed to survive and came
back, but often found their land squatted by old caseload returnees. The
early post-genocide diasporic return policies of the RPF were reversed by
2000 or so, causing chaos and hostility towards those courted by Rwanda,
especially the Banyamulenge in Eastern DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).
Banyamulenge were recruited into the Rwandan army and paramilitary
forces, especially in DRC, where they served as cannon-fodder. Later they
were literally abandoned, and even denied Rwandan citizenship (see profile
of exile Case 3 later).
Rwandan society has become much more complex since the genocide,
with four rather than two languages in current use; to French and
Kinyarwanda have been added English and Kiswahili, both more widely
used today. Both English and French feature on the government’s official
website, and are used for legal and administrative documents (des Forges,
2005). It is impossible, in any dealings with Rwandan officials, diplomats,
bureaucrats or NGO workers, not to notice the increasing dominance of the
anglophone ‘Ugandans’ (Hintjens and Kiwuwa, 2006; Rafti, 2004). This
small group virtually monopolizes the top echelons of the government
ministries and of the military. This dominance is resented by skilled fran-
cophone Rwandans, squeezed into the professions and business, and gener-
ally not as successful as their anglophone compatriots. Many ‘poor and
ordinary’ Rwandans, of course, speak neither French nor English. Since
the anglophone Ugandans did not grow up in Rwanda, and some did not
even speak fluent Kinyarwanda when they returned to the country, it is
likely that they are viewed as even more remote from the realities of daily
life for the rural poor than their predecessors.
It is no longer acceptable to refer to people publicly as Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa, since these terms are officially proscribed, but other ways of speaking
about ethnic identity have been found, and have in fact been provided by
the government in its own official categories for Rwandans. Another form
of political identification, widely used though not sanctioned by the
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government, is racial, where the terms ‘bantu’ and ‘hamite’ are used. Use of
these terms is a growing trend in the Great Lakes region and beyond
(Hintjens and Masemola, 2004).
Inside Rwanda today, the only officially sanctioned categories of social
and political identification, used in legal and administrative documents and
in public discourse, are derived from the official reading of the genocide and
related refugee movements. The main categories are: (1) survivors; (2) old
caseload returnees; (3) new caseload returnees; (4) suspected genocidaires.
In practice these overlap, especially (3) and (4). Debates on how many
Rwandans fit into these various categories are covered in the next section.
A tiny minority of the population (1%) are Twa and could fit into any and
all of these categories, or none at all. They remain a largely invisible
minority in Rwanda, although many were also killed during the genocide.
One could be forgiven for imagining that what mattered in Rwanda were
ethnic and race labels; sometimes history is presented as if this were the
case. In fact, in addition to the Hutu–Tutsi divide, which so dominated
politics during the early 1990s in particular, there were sharp sociopolitical
class and regional divisions among others. These were always salient
divisions for Rwandans, but were largely brushed under the carpet by the
dominant ethnic politics (Gasana et al., 1999). As officially sanctioned
categories of survivor, suspected génocidaire, and new and old caseload
returnees have come into widespread usage, rural–urban differences, class
conflict, regional tensions and the anglophone–francophone divide all tend
to be swept under the carpet. The question addressed in the next section is
how policies of the post-genocide regime have affected ordinary Rwandans
since 1994 in terms of their political identity choices and citizenship rights.
UNIT Y, PROGRESS AND PEACE?
In the search for unity and reconciliation, the Rwandan government’s main
instruments have been history, law and politics. This section deals with each
of these in turn before we examine changing economic and social conditions
in Rwanda in the section that follows, focusing on the impact on the
Rwandan poor.
History
Debates about Rwandan colonial and pre-colonial history will not be
rehearsed here, nor will the events of the genocide, since this has been
done elsewhere (for a classic history, see Lemarchand, 1970; also Eltring-
ham, 2004; Hintjens, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Pottier, 2002). As Gourevitch
asserts in his quotation used at the start of this article, ‘Rwandan history is
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dangerous’, and recent studies confirm this, showing how Rwandans’ own
versions of history, and key events recounted, vary depending on their prior
positioning in relation to recent history, the genocide and those in power in
Rwanda today (Eltringham, 2004). Eltringham’s study both draws on and
tends to confirm the findings of Lisa Malkki’s study of the historical narra-
tives of Burundian refugees in Tanzania during the early 1990s (Malkki,
1995).
For the current regime, only one account of Rwandan history is accept-
able, which is that all was well among Rwandans until the colonizers created
pseudo-racial, later ethnic identities, in order to quite deliberately divide
Rwandans against one another (van Hoyweghen and Vlassenroot, 2000:
98–100). For the RPF, the evils of genocide can be traced back directly to
these European colonial divide-and-rule strategies and the racial ideology
they imported (Hintjens, 2001; Hintjens and Masemola, 2004). This view of
Rwandan history explains why the RPF wants to remove ethnic and race
markers from politics altogether. They are viewed as incompatible with
modernity and decolonization. The Government of Rwanda official website
includes a section entitled ‘History’ that describes the ‘symbiotic’ quality of
social relations in pre-colonial Rwandan society, positing more or less
complete pre-colonial unity between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa (Government of
Rwanda, n.d.).
Most researchers reject this notion, but most also agree that the domi-
nance of one social group over another – which pre-existed the arrival of
Europeans in Rwanda – was greatly rigidified by colonial rule. In his widely
cited study of the causes of the 1994 genocide, Mamdani suggests pre-
colonial ethnic or caste divisions in Rwanda already existed and that
Belgian colonial administrative arrangements greatly intensified inequali-
ties and exacerbated differences between social groups, now defined in race
terms for the first time (Mamdani, 2001: 70). This seems more realistic than
the Rwandan Garden of Eden wrecked by the colonizers. Mamdani and
others go further and suggest that ethnic mobilization can be the precursor
for nationalism, and can be anti-colonial rather than racial and backward-
looking (Mamdani, 1996). For the RPF, the diaspora of 2 million Rwandan
refugees played a critical role, after all, in helping restore some semblance
of harmony and unity in Rwanda. The official understanding is that the
diaspora’s return from exile began on 1 October 1990, when the RPA
launched an armed attack from Uganda, starting a ‘war of liberation against
the military dictatorship in Kigali’ (Government of Rwanda, n.d.).
Suddenly the role of the diaspora became critical to restoring a Rwandan
sense of national identity over and above the racial-cum-ethnic labels
inherited from the past.
Political leaders always reinterpret history so that they cast themselves
in a more positive light, or make their job of managing others more manage-
able. The Hutu power ideology, during the early 1990s, repeatedly raised the
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spectre of Tutsi dominance, as refugees returned, not to liberate Rwandans
but to enslave them through force of arms and to reinstall the monarchy
(Eltringham, 2004). Ironically, in 1997, a monarchist movement did develop,
centred on the family of the former mwami or king, Kigeri V, calling for the
monarchy to be restored, with full powers. ‘The bi-ethnic support of the
monarchist movement alarmed the RPF’, because ‘. . . talk of monarchy is
“profane” in Rwanda’ (Rafti, 2004: 15). Many Hutu farmers who collabo-
rated with genocidal forces that took over the country after 6 April 1994
either faced, or believed they faced, the choice between kill or be killed
(Lyons and Straus, 2006). A few brave souls tried to maintain law and order
during the genocide; some refused to engage in genocidal killings, but few
of those survived, and even fewer were recognized. Some of those who
refused to participate were even hounded and killed after the genocide,
having been mistaken for genocidaires by the RPF (Cruvellier et al., 2004;
Lyons and Straus, 2006).
Events in neighbouring Burundi have long had powerful ‘ricochet’
effects across the border in Rwanda through ‘mirror image’ flows of
refugees and in the contrasting political composition, from the early 1960s
until 1994, of elites and the army (Hintjens, 1999; Lemarchand, 1996). The
RPF view of history shows little awareness of this connection, however, and
instead views Rwandan history since independence up to 1994 as a series
of persecutions of Tutsi. This narrow interpretation of the past fails to
acknowledge that not all Hutu benefited under the first two post-indepen-
dence Hutu-dominated regimes. The spectre of eternal Tutsi victimhood
does not help in opening up more complex and inclusive forms of political
identity for all Rwandans.
Law
After history, law is the second instrument of post-genocide reconstruction.
Shortly after the end of the genocide, the new government removed the
terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa from Rwandan identity cards. Major legal
changes were introduced in 2003, with a new Constitution and the Organic
Law of 2003 marking the end of the transitional regime, and the start of the
new Rwanda under the RPF and President Kagame. The terms Hutu, Tutsi
and Twa were banned in public discourse, and driven into the realm of
private spaces. Only an officially sanctioned reading of the genocide was
permissible in public; other versions were to be for private, informal spaces
only. The refashioning of Rwandan political identities was to be carried out
by various institutions, including a fund for survivors, a National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission and a National Human Rights Commission.
So-called solidarity camps were to re-educate Rwandans about their past;
but perhaps the most noteworthy legal innovation has been the gacaca
hearings, neo-traditional, open-air commune-level meetings that hear less
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serious crimes of genocide (Corey and Joireman, 2004). Gacaca have been
the subject of a great deal of scholarly, legal and media attention, as an
experiment in post-conflict justice with some ‘traditional’ elements of
restorative justice (Daly, 2002; Schabas, 2005).6 For some, gacaca offers the
prospect of combining restorative justice with retributive justice for lesser
crimes of genocide. So far, tens of thousands of suspects have been released
from prison to face justice in the local gacaca hearings; most passed through
solidarity camps on the way back to their own communities (Clark, 2005;
Carlin, 2003).
However, justice for the accused in gacaca is a haphazard affair. Without
any defence for the accused, serious miscarriages of justice can result; as
with the formal court system, innocent people can be imprisoned, for
instance, for having witnessed RPA war crimes, or for being involved in a
land dispute (for a disturbing example of the former, see Lyons and Straus,
2006: 50–58; on the latter see Pottier, 2000). Gacaca is only for crimes of
genocide in 1994, and the Rwandan government has: ‘stated repeatedly that
. . . these courts may not hear accusations of such crimes by soldiers of the
RDF [Rwandan Defense Force; the successor of the RPA], which must be
taken to regular courts, a position that continued to be questioned’ by many
Rwandans and outside observers (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The contri-
bution of gacaca to reconciliation and national unity is thus not self-evident;
dangers of retribution and false accusations are real enough; witnesses and
suspected genocidaires, as well as their relatives, have already been attacked
and even killed. At best, promoting post-conflict justice through gacaca is a
gamble that may occasionally result in healing. One observer of the process
noted the tendency for ‘two sides’ to distance themselves physically from
one another over time, as social groups placed themselves on opposite
sides of the proceedings, physically as well as ideologically remote (Clark,
2005). Dividing lines between Rwandans are, of course, difficult to heal,
given the recent past. There also remain attitudes in place that exacerbate
cleavages, combining: ‘Hierarchical leadership, passive acceptance of the
status quo and a culture of silence, rumours and mistrust’, none of which
helps to promote either a sense of shared citizenship or even trust, let alone
reconciliation (Jones, 2005: 95). Critics accuse the present government of
using the law as an instrument to protect and promote the interests of a tiny,
interconnected and mostly anglophone political elite (Pottier, 2002; Rafti,
2004; Reyntjens, 2004).
Politics
The third instrument is politics itself, including through legal reforms. The
goal of the regime in this respect seems to be, above all, to remain in
power and to disable its opponents and critics. The regime’s relentless
efforts to suppress all mention of ‘race’ and ethnicity have led to some
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counter-productive measures. The Organic Law introduced in 2003 allowed
political parties to be registered, but only if they could ‘. . . reflect the unity
of Rwandan people’, which begged the question of which unity was being
referred to. Under the same law, all political parties were ‘prohibited from
disseminating information (of) a denigrating or divisive nature’ about
elected and appointed political leaders, and were forbidden from using
‘words and acts that intend to denigrate or disparage a person in order to
unlawfully remove him or her from leadership positions’ (Articles 20,
40.10). This was mixed up with the crime of ‘Negationism or trivialization
of genocide’, prohibited under Article 40.14 of the same law, and ‘betraying
other politicians and the country’ under Article 41.4. This hotchpotch of
political correctness and political convenience highlights how law and
politics merge, and are designed in combination to prevent open criticism
of the current regime.
Following the presidential elections of August 2003, the impression has
been formed that the RPF government enjoys relatively high legitimacy and
support among ordinary Rwandans. Kagame obtained 95 percent of the
vote. On the other hand, all viable opposition had been eliminated, through
house arrests, false accusations of divisionism and so forth. The vote for
Kagame in the presidential elections was not surprising given his complete
stranglehold over the levers of state authority, and the widespread intimi-
dation of opponents (Carlin, 2003).
Far from supporting the regime, most Rwandans fear it; the political
climate has deteriorated, with assassinations and disappearances of
opposition politicians increasing since 2003. Prominent personalities have
been abducted and killed. One,Augustin Cyiza, a human rights campaigner,
former judge and former senior member of the army, disappeared in April
2003. According to several reports, he was abducted by the army (Cruvelier
et al., 2004; Front Line, 2005). However, the government claimed he fled to
Uganda, and then joined what was left of the Forces Armées Rwandaises
(FAR) in Congo, thus accusing one of its longest-standing critics, a former
ally, of wanting to ‘finish off the genocide’, an unlikely story (Cruvelier et
al., 2004: 204). Cyiza had experienced threats and a strong sense of menace
before his abduction; something that also comes across in the accounts of
individual exiles, presented towards the end of this article.
Almost anyone can find themselves an enemy of the regime; those
critical of RPF military and economic manoeuvres in DRC, those who
uncover the diversion of funds, or those who feel genocide survivors are not
being compensated properly (Reyntjens, 2004). The treatment of political
opponents has hardened if anything in recent years, and even prominent
Tutsi survivors, such as Assiel Kabera, have been gunned down – in his case
in 2000 in the middle of Kigali (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Opposition
politicians in Rwanda have been subjected to house arrest and show trials.
The main opposition party, Le Mouvement Démocratique Républicaine
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(MDR), remains banned, removing the need for overt fraud at election
times. The most vociferous critics of the RPF are often those who previ-
ously worked closely with Kagame; the former Prime Minister, a Hutu,
accused the RPF leadership of racism against himself and the Hutu majority
(Bizimungu, 2001). Unfortunately, the National Human Rights
Commission, created under the new Constitution of 2003, has proven
compliant, going along with the strategy of criminalizing Kagame’s politi-
cal opponents. Embassies have even been requested to provide lists of
names of Rwandan asylum seekers, which it claims are criminals on the run
(Cruvelier, 2004: 195). The evidence available points to a pattern of extra-
judicial killings by the Kigali authorities, both inside the country and in
neighbouring countries, including Kenya and the DRC (Cruvelier at al,
2004; Front Line, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2000).
In 2004, a major purge of judges, mayors, officials and teachers passed
almost unnoticed outside of Rwanda, except in human rights circles
(Human Rights Watch, 2005). The staff of Rwanda’s main independent
human rights organization, League for the Protection of Human Rights in
Rwanda (Liprodhor) fled Rwanda, having been accused publicly of divi-
sionism, its assets frozen. The Intelligence Services play a critical role in
monitoring and discrediting the regime’s opponents. Not surprisingly, most
Rwandans are afraid to vote for any but the ruling RPF party (Dorsey, 2000;
Front Line, 2005; Reyntjens, 2004). What goes on behind the scenes tends
to set the political agenda; debates in the media are like the part of the
iceberg visible above water (Dorsey, 2000; Rafti, 2004). Given that anyone
regarded as hostile by the present government can disappear, they are
usually well advised to leave Rwanda. So much so, that since 2003: ‘the flight
of Hutu and Tutsi public figures has transferred the opposition from the
Rwandan interior into exile’ (Rafti, 2004: 5).
SHIFTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS
Identity politics does not take place in a vacuum, and a critical challenge
for the prospects for more democratic forms of politics in Rwanda is an
improvement in the situation of ‘ordinary and poor’ Rwandans. This section
has an explicit focus on the position of the poorest and most vulnerable.
Superficially, Rwanda seems peaceful, secure and prosperous, and much
has improved in terms of the appearance of the urban environment, in
particular since 1994. If one visited the capital city, Kigali, and perhaps
Virunga National Park, one would leave with an impression of an orderly,
calm country that is doing quite well, in an undemonstrative kind of way.
But appearances are certainly deceptive in this respect. The dominant
feature of economic development in Rwanda since 1998 has been a shift
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from reliance on agricultural production based on staples such as tea and
coffee to an economy and public sector increasingly reliant on cross-border
‘rent-seeking’ economic activities, especially in the DRC, and development
aid (Eltringham and van Hoyweghen, 2000). To this extent, the real foun-
dations of wealth have shifted since the genocide, and this may mean that
efforts to tackle chronic and worsening rural poverty have become less
urgent for those in power, who depend on a much more extraverted pattern
of resources accumulation than their predecessors (Relief Web, 2003;
United Nations, 2002).
In economic terms, Rwanda has become a ‘basket case’ of develop-
ment (De Rivero, 2001). The few new jobs created are in urban areas,
where more and more impoverished and landless Rwandans try to eke
out their livelihoods (Verwimp, 2003; Walker, 2004). A draft report for
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) produced by staff of IDS
and ODI in the UK has concluded that whilst poverty was slightly
reduced by high annual growth rates of around 8 percent between 1995
and 2000, during the period of physical and institutional reconstruction,
the benefits of this growth ‘appeared to bypass most rural areas’ (Evans
et al., 2005: 15). The same researchers estimated that between 2000 and
2004, per capita incomes dropped from US$260 to US$220 (Evans et al.,
2005: 15). ‘Food and asset vulnerabilities remain widespread in rural areas,
with some regions subject to continuous food shortages’ (Evans et al.,
2005: 15). The same document shows, in Annex 1, that the population
living below the poverty line in Rwanda was to be reduced from 60 to 30
percent by 2015, a wildly unrealistic target in the circumstances (Evans et
al., 2005: 81).
Statistical indicators are always hard to interpret, but most indicators
suggest Rwanda is now more class divided and polarized than ever before.
The Gini coefficient, a recognized indicator of income distribution, rose
from 0.27 in 1985 to 0.46 by 1999–2000 (Evans et al., 2005: 15), a remark-
ably rapid increase. In 2001, an estimated 60 percent of Rwandan house-
holds had plots of less than half a hectare, barely enough to sustain a
household (Huggins and Musahara, 2004: 2). Seeming to ignore the
evidence that resettlement schemes rarely work, and that smaller farms,
using many micro-plots, can be more productive, the Rwandan govern-
ment introduced a new Land law in 2005 (Musahara and Huggins, 2004:
3; Jose, 2004). This law starts from the false premise that in the Rwandan
context, larger-scale farms would be more efficient than small family-
farmed plots. Distress sales of land, and land scarcity within large families,
mean that many rural poor now need food aid simply in order to survive.
Yet the land law recognizes only those landless families classified as ‘old
caseload’ returnees. In other words, those who returned from the
Rwandan, mainly Tutsi, diaspora after years abroad in Uganda, Burundi
and elsewhere (Musahara and Huggins, 2004: 3). The ‘. . . rational nature
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of . . . diversified cropping patterns’, is denied, and the five to 10 plots,
spread around over different kinds of land and topography, which most
farmers cultivate, are to be consolidated under the new law (Musahara and
Huggins, 2004: 3).
Determined to concentrate land-holdings and ‘modernize’ agriculture
through intensification, the regime shows a certain indifference for the
expertise and knowledge of Rwanda’s mostly very poor and small-scale
farmers. The social distance between urban elites and small-scale peasant
producers is probably greater than before the genocide. Landless rural
families live in extreme poverty, with recurring food shortages now affect-
ing some regions. Many of the poor lack even basic access to health care
and education. The problem of small-scale producers in Rwanda is not a
Malthusian one, however, as some would have us believe (Andre and
Platteau, 1998). It is the outcome of elite land-grabbing, which has allowed
a few people to amass huge holdings, including the lion’s share of good
quality arable land. Small producers still make up the vast majority of
Rwanda’s people, but are by-passed in the quest for modernization. The
government of Rwanda presents its land reform proposals as if moderniza-
tion is unavoidable, and implies a shift towards more ‘productive’, larger-
scale agricultural production units. Some donors seem ready to agree
(Mosley, 2004). As in the past, it seems the combination of high aid depen-
dency and authoritarian governmental style serves to perpetuate structural
violence in Rwandan social relations (Maina Peter and Kibalama, n.d.;
Uvin, 1998).
But in many rural areas, violence has been more than structural. There
has been force used, especially in the north-west, to oblige new caseload
returnees in particular, to move into villages, causing a security situation
that Rafti describes as: ‘armed peace’, an apt description of the besieged
state of many ordinary and poor Rwandans (Rafti, 2004). Conflicts pit very
small producers against larger land-owning farmers with better access to
markets, credit and inputs. The peasantry with their machetes and
‘weeding’ practices were once the heroes of the Kigali authorities; now
they seem irreversibly associated with the genocide in the mind of the
political, military and economic elite that runs Rwanda. Their very poverty
is treated as a barrier to progress and modernity rather than a cause for
concern.
A possible clue as to why the government’s attitude towards the rural
poor may be so dismissive lies in an emerging war over numbers, centring
on who died, who took part in the genocide, and is therefore legitimately a
victim or a suspect, a survivor or a possible genocidaire. The following
section considers these debates.
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DEBATING NUMBERS
Time does not seem the great healer it is generally thought to be in the
Rwandan context. On the contrary, during the first decade after the 1994
genocide, the classification of victims and perpetrators has evolved so as to
include fewer and fewer victims and survivors and to point at more and
more potentially or actually culpable perpetrators. There have been
continuous re-readings of the genocide and the outcome seems more likely
to further social and inter-group polarization than reconciliation and social
peace. A visiting journalist noted that the first genocide commemorations
in 1995 had been a genuine exercise in collective mourning for all
Rwandans, but by 2004, the frank recollection of the events of the genocide
had been overtaken by an officially elaborated rhetoric, an officially sanc-
tioned version of the genocide (Remy, 2004). This story of the genocide is
hegemonic in the sense that it defines who should be considered ‘true’
victims and villains of the genocide, and ultimately transmits the meaning
of the genocide for the present.
When new caseload refugees started to return to Rwanda from 1996
onwards, they faced suspicions of active or at least passive involvement in
the 1994 genocide of Tutsi. With time, instead of becoming more circum-
scribed, what is worrying is that the circle of the guilty seems to have grown.
Mamdani observed this at first hand:
Every time I visited post-genocide Rwanda, I would ask responsible state
officials . . . how many ordinary civilians they thought had participated in the
genocide. Every time the answer was in the millions. Even more troubling, the
estimate grew with each visit (Mamdani, 2001: 266).
The highest academic estimate calculates that 10 percent of Rwandan Hutu
took an active part in the genocide in 1994, representing around
350,000–600,000 people (Lemarchand, reported in Eltringham, 2004: 69). In
mid-2003, The East African reported that 571,934 suspected genocidaires
were held on the computer database of Rwanda’s then-Prosecutor General
Gerald Gahima (Martin, 2003). In line with this, Human Rights Watch
reported that the Prosecutor General had estimated that up to 500,000
people would eventually be tried in gacaca courts (Human Rights Watch,
2005; Martin, 2003).
But more recently much higher estimates have appeared that seem
designed to divide Rwandans along ‘race’ or ‘ethnic’ lines once more. In
1999, Paul Kagame reportedly claimed the true figure of genocide suspects
was close to one million, the Rwandan ambassador to Belgium later giving
a figure of two million, equivalent to the entire adult male Hutu population
of Rwanda at the time (Eltringham, 2004: 70). Finally, at a major confer-
ence held at the University of Oxford, UK, in May 2004, the then Deputy
Prosecutor for Rwanda, General Martin Ngoga, referring to gacaca, showed
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the same irresponsible attitude, claiming that ‘[e]ven if we find three
quarters of the population guilty of genocide, it is not a problem’ (Ngoga,
2004). At the same time, acquittals of those accused of crimes of genocide
in Rwandan courts increased from 9 percent in 1997 to almost 25 percent
by 2002 (Liprodhor in Amnesty International, 2002). The circle of genocide
suspects has widened, in part, thanks to the gacaca plea-bargaining system;
naming others and confessing one’s own guilt are ways of reducing or
commuting one’s own sentence (Clark, 2005: 14–15).
The question of who died during the war and during the genocide of 1994
is linked to questions of commemoration. As corpses were unearthed in
Rwanda after 1994, Hutu claimed their relatives were buried alongside the
remains of acknowledged Tutsi victims of the genocide in the same mass
graves (Pottier, 2002: 160–4). They wanted their relatives recognized as
victims of genocide and civil war. Yet officially the position is that ‘moderate
Hutu’, as they are officially referred to, were mostly killed during the
genocide; those who were not are not survivors – they are just lucky. Their
contribution in some cases to resisting genocide remains largely unacknowl-
edged, outside some well known political leaders and human rights activists
(Walsh, 2004). Yet evidence of mass killings of Hutus during the genocide
for refusing to collaborate, or later by the RPA for supposedly having
collaborated, is available in personal accounts as well as large-scale studies
(for personal accounts, see Lyons and Straus, 2006). The highest estimate
(Davenport and Armstrong, 2004) of around half a million Hutu murdered
during the genocide seems on the high side, but the RPF estimate of 60,000
‘moderate Hutu’ killed during the genocide is almost certainly an under-
estimate (Reuters, 3 April 2004; University of Maryland, 2004). The RPF
estimate is that just 6 percent of those killed during the genocide period
and civil war from April to July 1994 were Hutu (Reyntjens, 2004: 178). One
expert has proposed that since around one million Tutsis lived in Rwanda
before 1994, and only around 200,000 or so survived, it follows that around
800,000 victims of the genocide were Tutsi, leaving around 200,000 Hutu
victims (Reyntjens, 2004: 178). In other words, of the victims of genocide,
some 800,000 were killed because they were identified as enemies along
‘racial’ lines, and around 200,000 more were victims of genocide, selected
for political rather than ‘racial’ reasons, but nonetheless politically
identified for slaughter. Precise numbers cannot be known for certain
(Eltringham, 2004: Ch. 3; Kakwenzire and Kamukama, 1999: 64).
Hutu killed or injured because they refused to kill Tutsi, refused to use
a gun, sought not to inform or tried to protect Tutsis, should be considered
victims of genocide, or survivors. Their deaths should be investigated, and
their killers brought to justice. The victims of genocide should not be
defined in racial terms; selecting people on this basis gives objective value
to the fiction of race. In recognizing only Tutsi victims and survivors, the
RPF regime claims the race ideology as its own, implicitly. In this context,
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the term ‘Holocaust’, which originally referred to all those killed by Nazis,
only later came to refer exclusively to Jewish victims of Nazi killings, exclud-
ing Roma, Ukrainians, Poles, communists, homosexuals or those considered
mentally or physically ‘unfit’ (Novick, 2001: 20–22).
We now consider the implications of the regime’s emerging gallery of
goodies and baddies, sinners and saints, for citizenship.
OF SAINTS, SINNERS AND CITIZENSHIP
Narrowing down who is a victim, who a survivor, and broadening out the
scope of who can be considered a potential perpetrator serves to reduce the
inclusiveness of Rwandan citizenship in the post-genocide context. A
twisted form of modernity besets not only poor Rwandans, but also their
leaders who, in attempting to get a ‘correct’ understanding of the genocide,
have unwittingly embraced the logic of race. Seeing Rwandan society as
unavoidably divided between recognized victims, and others vaguely or
more tangibly suspected of crimes of genocide serves to force the mainly
Hutu majority into the confessional booth, and the minority onto the cross.
Neither position is particularly comfortable.
Opening up citizenship for all Rwandans will require seeing beyond
presumptions of guilt and innocence, and making horizontal as well as
vertical social relations more inclusive and participatory. What are needed
are accounts of the genocide that undermine the pseudo-scientific
categories of race that underpinned it in the first place, rather than shoring
these categories up, however inadvertently.7 The ‘. . . lack of open debate
about Rwanda’s painful past’ (Walsh, 2004) means that citizenship is empty
of real content. Being a Rwandan implies few if any material benefits for
the poorest and most marginalized in society. Those who stayed alive and
are Tutsi are called survivors, and most have access to some kind of funding
for survivors. The others are not commemorated, and this is bound to have
negative implications for their rights as full Rwandan citizens.
Rafti points out that the way the International Criminal Tribunal on
Rwanda (ICTR) has operated has tended to perpetuate a false impression
that ‘the Tutsi were the only victims of crimes committed in Rwanda’ (Rafti,
2004: 10). When the ICTR was established, the idea was to prosecute all war
crimes, including but not limited to crimes of genocide. The legal principle
was individual criminal responsibility, rather than collective guilt or inno-
cence. But the ICTR completely failed to bring RPA soldiers to trial, and
former chief prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, eventually resigned over non-
cooperation by the Rwandan authorities, who blocked all efforts to gather
evidence on charges against members of the RPA. Alison des Forges has
convincingly argued that impunity is not just a problem for those who are
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victims and their relatives; it is a problem for the regime too, because it sows
antagonisms and resentments in the present that can grow into possible
retaliation and violence in the future (des Forges, 1999; Kiwuwa, 2006;
Pottier, 2002: 157–9; Reyntjens, 2004: 204).
The process resembles the projection of Jewish victimhood into the past
by the official history commemorated by the Israeli authorities: ‘certifica-
tion as (vicarious) victims could be claimed’, comments Novick, ‘with all the
moral privilege accompanying such certification’ (Novick, 2001: 8). Under
the ‘History’ sub-section ‘Genocide’ on the Government of Rwanda
website (n.d.), killings of Tutsi in 1959 are presented as the precursor of
genocide. This period, called the Rwandan Revolution by some, was in fact
a Belgian-backed coup against the monarchy. The new regime depicts this
era as the harbinger of genocide, referring to ‘a habit’ of anti-Tutsi killings
under the two previous Hutu-dominated regimes. The implication of this is
that the political project of both post-independence Rwandan regimes was
implicitly genocidal through and through, a highly contentious and divisive
position.
The peculiar identity politics of the post-genocide political leadership of
Rwanda, represented by the RPF and Kagame himself, can best be under-
stood as a version of what Robin Cohen has termed victim diasporic nation-
alism (Cohen, 1997). The implicit or explicit assumption is that a social
grouping with some identifiable common origins has been victimized
continuously over a long period of time. Members of this victim group have
been forced into a diaspora, into exile, and have the right to return – in this
case to Rwanda – to reclaim their ‘promised land’ denied them by a history
of persecution (Cohen, 1997; van der Meeren, 1996). For the RPF, the Tutsi
who went into exile in the 1960s following their persecution merit the status
of official victims in this version of national Rwandan history. This was clear
also from our brief discussion of the official Government of Rwanda
website version of Rwandan history. Reconstructed Rwandan nationalism
on the basis of this myth of diasporic Tutsi victimhood cannot form the basis
for the unifying Rwandan nationalism, the regime claims to be promoting.
If the foundation myth for their vision of Rwanda is centred on the
genocide experience in this way, and simplifies the whole experience into
goodies versus baddies, then it does not open up a more democratic future,
or more inclusive ways of constructing citizenship in future.
For Hutu Rwandans, whether the regime intended this or not, identity
politics has become tied up with anticipating accusations of bias and
genocide denial, and they need to exculpate their guilt even where they do
not feel it. Forgetting is simply not an option, and yet some forgetfulness,
as Novick argues, is needed for processes of healing and reconciliation, and
so that peace and shared civic values can be constructed (Novick, 2001:
164–5). The real complexity of Rwandan history, and the urgent imperatives
of overcoming social injustices are lost in the government’s apparently
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ceaseless task of commemorating and preventing genocide. Real
Rwandans’ lives simply do not fit into the over-simplified choices that the
regime offers them today (Lemarchand, 1999).
After the RPF came to power, it emerged that they too had committed
their share of war crimes. Many civilians were killed by the RPF, as well as
genocidal killing squads disciplining their own, not to mention hunger and
disease. Rwandans with mixed backgrounds could lose both their parents;
one during the genocide, the other in flight. Tens and perhaps hundreds of
thousands of Rwandans’ deaths were caused by RPA military intervention
in Eastern Congo and the resulting flight of Rwandan refugees in terror.
Many of those who fled in 1994 ‘have never been located’, and have simply
disappeared without trace (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This is why the
estimates of the numbers killed by the RPA vary enormously. In 1996, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) acknowl-
edged, ‘. . . many refugees did have genuine concerns about safety and
justice in Rwanda’, but yet the same organization declared it was safe for
Rwandans to return (Pottier, 2002: 133).
In one of the most widely reported atrocities, the RPA killed at least
2,000–4,000 refugees at Kibeho camp on the Tanzanian border. The camp
was destroyed by the RPA in 1996, and the killings took place in full sight
of UN troops, who were unable to intervene (Pottier, 2000). The new
caseload refugees’ worries were not taken seriously by most of the inter-
national community, who bought the official line that those who refused
to come back to Rwanda were genocide hardliners. Only a handful of
NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, remained to provide humani-
tarian assistance to the last desperate columns of fleeing Rwandans as
they moved deeper into Zaire, where most gave up the ghost (Williams,
2004).
The official line was that those who fled were terrorized by their own
guilt, not by the RPA, and were simply: ‘. . . unwilling to face the reality of
genocide’ (Eltringham, 2004: 109; Pottier, 2002: 133; Williams, 2004: 5). They
were accused of being in denial, running away from justice. Their deaths too
were presented as self-induced; they were killed because they would not
come back peacefully to Rwanda. The significance of Pottier’s phrase,
included earlier among scholarly prognoses for Rwanda, is apparent here.
As he comments, if this twisted logic persists, ‘Rwanda . . . and the Great
Lakes region generally, will remain entrapped in an official discourse which
legitimates the use of violence and makes some, leaders and led, géno-
cidaires’ (Pottier, 2002: 207). By claiming a virtual monopoly of virtue, the
current leadership of Rwanda presents its victims as responsible for their
own persecution, mistreatment, disappearance and even death. They are
swept out of mind, as backward looking people, hopeless cases who have
no eye to the future, no understanding of the past, as the damned (Rafti,
2004: 11).
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It thus remains true that: ‘. . . the immediate challenge in Rwanda is to
undercut Hutu and Tutsi as political identities . . . this will not happen so
long as the minority monopolizes power’ (Mamdani, 2001: 281). This applies
whatever the background and socialization of the elite in power. To help
discern the potential for new and more inclusive forms of political identity
to emerge in Rwanda today, we consider people who find themselves
located, or pushed, onto the boundaries of ethnic or and national identity
polarizations, between Hutu and Tutsi and between Rwandan and non-
Rwandan. These profiles provide a deeper insight into how identity politics
operates in Rwanda, and complement the kind of evidence we have
considered so far in this article. The individuals’ mixed backgrounds are
significant, as will be explained.
PROFILES OF RWANDAN EXILES
The three individuals whose profiles follow sought refuge outside the
country for political, and in some ways similar, reasons. For each one, his or
her identity as a mixed person complicated their position, since they strad-
dled boundaries of ‘race’ and ‘nationality’, in a way not accommodated by
officially recognized categories of political identification. These people’s
political identities were reconstructed several times over in post-genocide
Rwanda, as will become evident. Their experiences suggest the state of
inter-group relationships in the country. Post-genocide Rwandan recon-
struction has been a painful process for all three, involving violence, death
and loss. At the very least, the choies they have faced have been stark. In
each case, the exile’s name has been changed.
Case 1: Noelle Angelicas (female)
Noelle’s father was a prominent official under the former Habyarimana
regime, and this automatically made Noelle a suspected génocidaire in
present-day rural Rwanda. She is the only known survivor of a family of 10
and the offspring of a mixed Hutu–Tutsi marriage. Her mother was Tutsi
and was killed at the start of the genocide of 1994. Noelle inherited her
mother’s looks and is taken for a Tutsi. Her father and seven siblings are all
presumed dead, and either fled or were killed following attacks by RPA
soldiers on their camp in the former Zaire in 1996. Noelle survived for years
hidden in the house of a priest in Kivu. After being raped by an RPA soldier
in 2001, she gave birth to a son the following year. Heavily pregnant, Noelle
moved to Rwanda from former Zaire, and lived there with a relative. This
relative was involved in an opposition party, banned the same year for
being ‘divisive’ and ‘ethnicist’. Shortly afterwards, he was arrested by RPA
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soldiers and disappeared. Noelle was warned that the soldier who raped her
was looking for her. Fearing for her life, she fled Rwanda. Noelle has been
trapped between her father’s reputation as a prominent (though not active)
official under the previous regime, and her status as a victim of rape by an
RPA soldier. She fears she could be silenced as a witness to war crimes in
former Zaire, now DRC. In spite of her ‘Tutsi’ appearance, she is clear that
she can not share her mother’s political identity as a genocide victim
because of her Hutu father. Noelle was initially refused asylum on the
grounds that she had nothing to fear from returning to Rwanda, and that it
was unlikely the RPA soldier who had threatened to silence her ‘for good’,
would do so. She eventually obtained asylum.
This woman’s Tutsi appearance and the Tutsi identity of her mother did
not protect her from persecution after the genocide, neither in former
Zaire, nor on return to Rwanda, where she did not feel safe. The political
identity affixed to her was of a new caseload returnee – one guilty by associ-
ation of being active in the political opposition. Rather than disappearing
like her relative, Noelle decided to go into exile. Ironically, the journey was
paid for by an RPA soldier who warned her she was targeted by her rapist,
took pity on her and helped her escape Rwanda.
Case 2: Julius Gasana (male)
Julius is the son of a mixed marriage, and like Noelle, his father was Hutu
and his mother Tutsi. His mother was killed at the start of the genocide, on
9 April 1994. Julius’s father was killed at the same time for trying to defend
his Tutsi wife from being killed. Julius is therefore, by any definition of
genocide, a genocide survivor. He remained hidden inside Rwanda until
July when the RPF took over, confirming his political identity as someone
who lost his family as a direct result of the genocide. However, one of his
father’s brothers is to be found on the official list of Category 1 genocide
suspects, and was an active killer around Gitarama (not real location). This
uncle’s whereabouts are unknown, and he is presumed dead in former
Zaire. As the oldest surviving male relative of this uncle suspected of
genocide, Julius’s status as victim of genocide is forgotten. Instead, he
became a target of Tutsi survivors in his hometown and was attacked and
badly injured by his neighbours. When Julius complained to the police, they
did nothing to protect him from further attacks, and did not investigate.
Since Julius’s uncle was a suspected genocidaire, and even though Julius lost
both parents to the genocide, and awaited the RPA inside Rwanda in 1994,
he inherited his uncle’s reputation as a killer. Unable to claim the status of
genocide survivor, Julius is instead blamed for the crimes of his Hutu uncle.
Although he fits the image of a typical Tutsi, and is loyal to the RPF, who
saved him when they took over the country, Julius is guilty by association
with his father’s brother. Unsafe in his home community, he fled Rwanda
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and sought protection overseas. However, his asylum application in the UK
was refused. The UK Home Office in the country of asylum claimed not to
believe that a Rwandan survivor such as Julius could be persecuted by other
survivors simply for being born to the relative of a Category 1 genocide
suspect. This was in spite of substantial evidence. He appealed the decision.
Julius’s story shows how misleading terms such as ‘survivor’ and
‘genocide suspect’ can be, and how guilt and innocence are not clear
categories when it comes to real people. The genocide cut across Rwandan
society and literally cut families in half, sometimes making of an individual
such as Julius both a victim and a presumed perpetrator. Although the
genocide did divide Rwandan people in ways other than ‘racial’, these non-
racial divisions are often overlooked in efforts to bring those accused of
crimes of genocide to justice. An interesting element of Julius’s account is
the horizontal violence by survivors against the relative of a suspected geno-
cidaire, something relatively rarely reported in the media, in constrast with
the killing of survivors.
Case 3: Modus Nzishura (male)
Modus’s father was Rwandan and his mother a Congolese Banyamulenge.
In terms of his own identity, he describes himself as both Banyamulenge
and Rwandan. Prior to 1999, Banyamulenge were encouraged to return to
Rwanda as part of the RPF’s diasporic form of nationalism. However, after
2000, this policy was reversed, and Modus’s father was advised to divorce
his mother because she was Congolese. His father refused, and as a result
Modus was unable to obtain Rwandan citizenship. Under Congolese law,
Modus was not entitled to Congolese citizenship either. Modus’s father,
who had consistently campaigned against the war in eastern DRC, was shot
dead at point blank range in Kigali by the Rwandan army in 2003. This was
the official response to his demand for withdrawal of Rwandan troops from
DRC. His body was dumped in the road outside the family home in a resi-
dential area of the city. Modus’s mother and sister were later arrested and
both disappeared. Modus claims to be of Tutsi appearance, and has lived for
many years in Rwanda. He had a Rwandan father, but cannot call himself
a Rwandan. He is stateless. In terms of his own political identity, Modus is
trapped between a diasporic reality that includes the Banyamulenge, or
elements of them, and an increasingly narrow definition of citizenship being
employed by the Rwandan government. Claiming asylum, Modus was
initially refused, on the grounds that the story he recounted of his father’s
killing was not believed. However on appeal, he was allowed to remain for
a limited period, mainly because his statelessness made it difficult to decide
where to return him to.
Modus’s statelessness results from the rapidly hardening boundaries of
national citizenship in the Great Lakes region of today, and the internal
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fragmentation of DRC. The Banyamulenge, first courted and then aban-
doned by the RPF, were defined during the early post-genocide era as part
of the diasporic victim Tutsi nation, invited back into the country and
offered Rwandan nationality. The loss of nationality for this individual,
whether he considered himself to be Rwandan or Banyamulenge, obliged
him to subsist for years on the margins of two state systems, unable to claim
full citizenship in either. His position resembles in microcosm that of the
Banyamulenge writ large; accepted nowhere and subject to contradictory
impulses from warring parties. Branded a political opponent in Rwanda
because of his father’s outspoken views, Modus’s choice of political
identities has been very circumscribed. After members of his family were
killed, he went into exile in order to survive.
Each of these three profiles illustrates how tightly people’s political identi-
ties can be constrained by the official and informal parameters of recog-
nized political identities, citizenship and nationality; guilt and innocence.
Within these parameters, individuals’ identifications are made in the face of
strictly limited choices, and even appearance becomes irrelevant. Not iden-
tical to the race categories of the past, these individuals’ political identities
cut across the available: ‘old caseload’, ‘survivor’ (the first covers anglo-
phone and francophone former exiled Tutsis, the second Rwandan-born
Tutsis); ‘new caseload’ or ‘suspected génocidaire’, almost always Hutu. In
each case, the mixed background of the individual profiled has exposed
them to state violence, violence from militias and even from families and
neighbours.
These Rwandans of mixed heritage are of interest as they fall between
various post-genocide categories of political identity and their experiences
show up some of the fissures not always as visible at the collective level
(Mamdani, 2001: 45). At the very least, we have to conclude that the polar-
ized ‘race’ identities of the past are not about to disappear under a consen-
sual notion of shared and inclusive Rwandan citizenship. Each story
highlights the complexity and ambiguity of a real-life circumstance, cut
across by the simplistic, unitary narrative of genocide promoted and sanc-
tioned by the Rwandan political authorities. Complexity cannot be accom-
modated into the neatly divided categories of guilt and innocence, the
blessed and the damned. Each profile shows that individuals are blamed for
the sins of their relatives; all three find themselves – quite typically of mixed
people in conflict situations – squeezed between the polarized political
identities of their mixed parentage.
Mixed individuals like these Rwandans seem to have even more diffi-
culty establishing their entitlement to full Rwandan citizenship today than
they did in the pre-genocide system, where quotas applied and race
categories were imposed from above, instead of being banned. If political
identities are more complex in Rwanda now than before 1994, Rwandans
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should at least be able to overcome the old boundaries of racial identity
imposed from colonialism onwards. Shared citizenship and more inclusive
and cross-cutting forms of Rwandan national identity should gradually be
replacing the exclusive forms citizenship took in the past (Kabeer, 2005).
The three cases suggest that new kinds of Rwandan political identities have
emerged since the genocide, but that schisms in Rwandan society remain all
too familiar. Official accounts of the genocide have ‘frozen’ political iden-
tities, reinforcing informal community-level guilt-by-association, like the
kind Julius described above. The official myth of the genocide has in effect
become the foundation myth of the new Rwanda (Monbiot, 2004).
Rwandans are increasingly identified politically in terms that have
nothing to do with their experience, but which have to do with how their
(generally male) relatives are officially remembered. The ‘survivor’
category thus mostly excludes those with Tutsi mothers but Hutu fathers,
even if they are of ‘Tutsi’ appearance, like the three individuals profiled
here. It is as if today in Rwanda only one set of victims can be accommo-
dated, meaning that: ‘Hutu are forbidden any collective mourning’ (Remy,
2004). That someone like Noelle or Julius is not able to claim the status of
‘genocide survivor’ in Rwanda today is telling; it seems a weird inversion
of the racial ideology of genocide. Even those with partial Hutu (or non-
Rwandan) ancestry can warrant exclusion from full Rwandan citizenship.
Perhaps only ‘pure’ Tutsi cannot be accused of crimes of genocide under the
gacaca system! In effect, Rwandans with a mixed Hutu–Tutsi background,
or those who have suffered at the hands of the RPF, cannot form their own
political identities outside the confines of the officially allowed categories.8
Anecdotal evidence suggests that inter-‘race’ marriages have become less
common in Rwanda since the end of the genocide; hardly surprising
(Aghion, 2002; Kiwuwa, 2006). Driving the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
underground may in the future reinforce the appeal of mobilizing opposi-
tion to the government in power along these lines (Zack-Williams, 2003).
During the genocide, some mixed people and some Hutu as well as Tutsi
tried to save neighbours and relatives, and to resist taking part in killings.
Most were targeted and killed, but some survived to tell the tale. One of the
best known is Paul Rusesabagina, former manager of Hotel des Mille
Collines, profiled on UK radio (BBC Radio 4, 2002) and hero of a recent
Hollywood movie Hotel Rwanda. He claims not to be a hero, and considers
what he did as quite normal. He kept senior military commander, General
Augustin Bizimungu, plied with drinks from the hotel bar, in order to save
the lives of refugees inside the hotel. He claims that because of his mixed
Hutu–Tutsi background, he felt Rwandan first and foremost. Not loved by
the regime in Kigali, Rusesabagina has been in exile for several years.
Progressively excluded from the category of genocide ‘survivors’ or victims,
Hutu survivors, even those who remained inside Rwanda waiting for the
RPA to ‘rescue them’, have been labelled génocidaires or even shot after
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resisting genocide in their locality (Cases 2 and 3 earlier; Lyons and Straus,
2006: 60; Mamdani, 2001: 267).
This section of the article in particular has tried to ‘ease a number of
complex voices back into the debate . . . the voices of people that have
nuanced stories to tell’ (Pottier, 2002: 202). Post-genocide strivings for
justice through community participation depend on goodwill and trust
among Rwandans, something the actions of the present government do not
always manage to support (Clark, 2005: 21). As always, real life is far more
complex than the tidy logic of political ideology can recognize. Not
everyone is either a victim or a perpetrator; in reality many people are
neither, and some are both, and as the profiles highlighted earlier sought to
show, this is something that makes it impossible to talk of the situation in
Rwanda today in terms of either the categories of colonial and post-colonial
‘race’ ideology or the categories of the current official understanding of the
genocide and the diasporic origins of national renewal.
CONCLUSION: REINVENTING RWANDAN CITIZENSHIP
Assessing post-genocide political identities is complex; the benchmark for
deciding whether political identities are being redefined in positive ways is
not obvious. Modernity is, after all, as much about militarization, civil wars
and economic slumps, as about economic progress, improvements in health
and social harmony (Abrahamsen, 2003). The Rwandan government’s
official version of history has been that the genocide of Tutsi was motivated
by race ideas that were colonial in origin. Progress and modernity, RPF
style, seem to be about protecting Rwandans from themselves, since their
attitudes are irrevocably tainted with colonialism and race ideologies. The
government has a point, of course: where racial views are widespread this
is not compatible with social peace, but what is worrying is that as the
genocide itself moves further away, there is a growing emphasis on its
remembrance and categories, as officially defined. This makes for very
mixed messages. The government wants reconciliation, yet it constantly
draws attention back to the cataclysm that beset Rwandans in 1994, and
thus draws attention to those who were killers, contrasting their evil with
the innocence of those they killed.
Survivors’ stories today are almost all Tutsi stories, just as Holocaust
stories have by definition almost all become Jewish stories. By preserving
genocide as the defining moment of Rwandan history, the RPF regime has
elevated Tutsi into victims, even those not directly targeted in the genocide.
And Hutu, even those who refused to kill, become suspected accomplices
at best, and genocidal killers at worst. The RPA become a ‘liberation army’,
which ended genocide and offered loyal Rwandans enlightenment and
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modernity/progress. The return of the mainly Tutsi diaspora through force
of arms thus marks a heroic turning point in the construction of a new
Rwanda. Instead, what is needed to promote a spirit of reconciliation is not
heroics but a frank recognition that in real life, moral choices are almost
never straightforward (Strauss, 2006: 246).
Genocide memorials and remains all over Rwanda honour victims of the
genocide, but also serve to constantly remind Rwandans of their painful and
traumatizing experiences, perhaps making reconciliation and healing more
difficult.
Most Rwandans say that much as they try to put the events of the genocide
behind them, they can’t. ‘How can you forget when there are genocide sites
everywhere around us?’ (Kamuze, 2003)
Where the central priority is ‘never again’, forgetting the past is not an
option. The past is omnipresent, in its officially sanctioned version, its hall
of saints and sinners, with the RPF firmly on the side of the angels. Such
images undermine the building of public trust across society as well as
between rulers and the ruled. The concerns of ordinary and poor Rwandans,
especially, are not addressed sufficiently seriously by this government. As
people are left to sort out their problems as best they can, in relations with
neighbours, former killers and families, the result can be paralysis for those
who are depressed and despondent, feel unable to look forward, and cannot
overcome their trauma (Clark, 2005: 17). There are some signs of hope; in
her films about gacaca, made over several years, Anne Aghion managed to
convey the extreme complexity of relationships between former perpetra-
tors and those who can be described as survivors, and what can happen
when they start to recreate connections and manage to reach a certain
understanding (Aghion, 2002, 2005). Clark says that what most Rwandans
hope for, for instance from gacaca, is simple acknowledgement; ‘a chance
to talk about their emotional experiences and for the community to
acknowledge their pain and suffering’ (Clark, 2005: 20). Ignoring some
people’s traumas whilst focusing overly much on the traumas of others, can
damage those who receive too much attention and those who feel
neglected. A more therapeutic approach would need to be more responsive
to expressed needs and needs ‘from below’. Strangling the ability of
Rwandans to question their government and its legitimacy will not help.
What really happened during the genocide and civil war period was
enormously complex and varied, as recent studies have highlighted
(McDoom, 2005; Strauss, 2006). Recognizing this complexity of social
relations in Rwanda is vital if social reconciliation and a more inclusive
form of citizenship are to be achieved.9 No sweeping debate on numbers
can resolve the ‘race’ issue, which remains a lethal weapon (Hintjens, 2001).
The ideology of race needs dismantling from within and undone before
modernity can become a bit less twisted in future (Montagu, 1953). As Nigel
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Eltringham has remarked ‘seeking and imposing clarity is both the cause of
and a response to genocide’ (Eltringham, 2004: xiv). Dividing Rwandans
into victims and perpetrators tends to undermine their own best efforts to
overcome their past and live together without violence. In trying to recon-
struct their own political identities as Rwandans along more inclusive and
non-racial lines, Rwandans unfortunately cannot look to the government
for positive examples. They can, of course, look to one another; religious
inspiration is common among grassroots movements since the genocide,
and generally seeks to promote forgiveness and a forward-looking
emphasis on what people have in common. There has not been space here
to deal with these forms of identity expression, but they merit further atten-
tion. Whatever the future holds, it is not this researcher’s role to sit, Cassan-
dra-like, predicting gloom or glory for Rwanda’s people. Rwandans are
fully aware of what they are up against, especially those who live with the
present regime on a daily basis and have somehow to fit into the tightly
twisted social order of the country.
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Notes
1 ‘Race’, which denotes a politics of racial identification, has become more and
more a vector for conflict in Burundian as well as Rwandan post-independence
history. The term race is used because the ‘Bantu’ and ‘Hamitic’ ideological
categories that underlie political identity conflicts along ‘ethnic’ or ‘communal’
lines literally date back to the race theories of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries (for an account of this, see Hintjens, 2001). Elsewhere, David Kiwuwa
and I have argued that ideas about race, rather than ethnicity, have been used as
the dividing line in Rwanda and Burundi (Hintjens and Kiwuwa, 2006). The
current danger is not just of ethnic politics, but of a spill-over of racialized ideas
about political identity extending throughout the wider Great Lakes region
(Hintjens, 2006).
2 The author wishes to thank two anonymous referees for their comments which
helped to rework this article. Thanks also to the editors, on whose comments this
opening paragraph now draws, for their encouragement to rework and resubmit
the article to Ethnicities.
3 Over the past few years, as Kagame’s main political opponents have been impris-
oned or forced into exile, there have also been numerous disappearances of his
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Rwandan critics. The regime attempts to police exiles as well as opposition at
home, including through warnings to family members to keep their unruly
relatives in check. The Rwandan government has even requested lists of asylum
seekers from western governments, claiming that many are criminals escaping
justice (Cruvelier et al., 2004: 195). There is an implied threat against those who
refuse to toe the official line, and even against their families. Yet exiles (and
foreigners like the author of this article) are the only ones able to state their
views relatively openly on what is happening inside Rwanda. All that may
restrain them is that their families or contacts may face intimidation ‘on their
behalf’.
4 The use of propaganda, of print journalism, radio and ‘event management’ is as
much an art in Rwanda today as it ever was, especially as the internet has become
a much more important instrument for audiences outside Rwanda, as well as for
the opposition to Kagame (Rafti, 2004; Thomson, 1999). There are some parallels
between the war on genocidal mentalities and the war on terrorism. The opening
quotation from Doom suggests that the political identities people mobilize round
make sense in the context of the ‘twisted modernity’ that besets post-colonial
societies. But the RPF cannot see things this way, since all ethnic identifications
for them are tantamount to divisionism and a genocide mentality. All are
considered backward-looking, and ultimately barbaric.
5 On forms of denial by governments, see the exceptionally accessible and
thought—provoking study by Stanley Cohen (2002). His classification detailed
below has been used in another paper by the author (Hintjens, 2003). Cohen’s
article provides a particularly helpful classification of the range of denial strat-
egies used by governments in particular:
● Silence: by ignoring accusations completely, the government chooses to
remain silent and indifferent in the face of criticism. This was particularly
the case prior to the genocide itself.
● Righteousness: by invoking a higher moral or religious order, and
claiming the right to act in promoting that order, whether that be ‘the
revolutionary struggle, ethnic purity, Western civilization’ (Cohen, 2002:
110).
● Necessity: arguing that what was done was done in self-defence to avoid
greater problems in the future. This was the case prior to 1994 as well.
● Denial or blaming of victims: ‘The atrocities of the last few decades show
there is no end to the historical spirals of conflicting claims about which
group is the original, “real” or ultimate victim’ (Cohen, 2002: 111). In
1990–94, viewing Tutsis as eternal outsiders was presented as justification
for eliminating them.
● Uniqueness: the government claims outsiders cannot understand the
situation, or their judgement of the exceptional measures taken would be
less harsh. This works more for the post-genocide government and its
denial of political repression, human rights abuses and war crimes than
for the pre-genocide forms of genocide denial.
● Advantageous comparisons: in other words claiming that under similar
circumstances your enemies, or others, would have done much worse, and
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that by comparison you have shown considerable restraint (Cohen, 2001:
109–12).
These categories permit an interpretation of policies of denial, both prior to and
during, as well as after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. For the point about intel-
ligence services and the military, Michael Dorsey, who was an aid worker in
Rwanda for two years, has written a chapter that is problematic in many ways –
being almost entirely unsourced, and replete with details that make no sense
unless one is already extremely familiar with the who’s-who of Rwanda. This
chapter is nonetheless one of the few detailed (though as I say, largely unsub-
stantiated) accounts of the extent of military and political repression in post-
genocide Rwanda. Dorsey particularly emphasizes the role of the intelligence
services and the youth wing of the RPA (Dorsey, 2000).
6 Interestingly, the parallel between Rwanda’s genocide and the Holocaust is
clearly understood by the Israeli government, which has had good relations with
Kagame’s Transitional government (Eltringham and van Hoyweghen, 2000: 240).
In 2003, Kagame met with Shimon Peres for official talks where, ‘Mr Peres
expressed full understanding and support for Rwanda as it works towards
ensuring that Genocide does not occur again in that country’ (Government of
Rwanda, n.d., 24 January 2003). There are concerns that closer ties with the
current US regime leads the Rwandan leaders to think they can continue to
intervene in the DRC without any negative consequences. Israel has also
provided Rwanda with some bilateral development aid since 1995, and for both
regimes the defining basis for national identity is genocide and the return of a
victim diaspora (on a fuller treatment of the Holocaust parallel see Eltringham,
2004: Ch. 3; Hintjens, 1999).
7 There is substantial evidence to indicate that appearance, rumour, accusations
and even bribery, rather than just one’s official race status on an identity card,
could determine whether a person actually lived or died during the genocide
(Eltringham, 2004: 26; Taylor, 1999: 72). Frantically seeking clarity amid a
complex and messy reality meant genocidal killers swept many people into their
nets, including those ‘suspected’ of being Tutsi or collaborators. Some Tutsi
survived because their appearance was typically ‘Hutu’ or because they were
otherwise able to avoid detection (Eltringham, 2004: 26; Taylor, 1999: 72). Tutsi
were rescued and protected by Hutu, some of whom were in command of militias
or killing teams and themselves killed other Tutsis.
8 The importance of a rights-based approach is formally recognized by most of the
major international donors, including more recently even the World Bank. The
importance of economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights is
now fully acknowledged by DfID (2003), for instance, and officially by the
Rwandan government as well.
9 Rwandans are not all equally ‘at home’ in the new Rwanda; some are forced into
exile and many more feel unwanted (Reyntjens, 2004: 194). Rwandans of mixed
Hutu-Tutsi background, and relatives of génocidaires may be particularly vulner-
able to persecution for their relatives’ misdeeds rather than their own.
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